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Groundwater is now the main 
source of water for all major 
water uses in India and needs to 
be given greater policy attention. 
The fact that it is a politically 
sensitive topic because any reform 
will affect some powerful 
constituencies cannot be an 
excuse anymore for lack 
of action. Inaction only 
increases existing inequalities in 
access to groundwater by 
progressively reinforcing the 
power of bigger landowners at 
the expense of other water users. 
This article examines the basic 
principles governing access to 
and use of groundwater 
inherited from the past to the 
Model Bill for the Conservation, 
Protection and Regulation of 
Groundwater, 2011, which 
provides a basis for rethinking 
groundwater regulation.
and environmentally unsustainable prin-
ciple that essentially links control over 
groundwater to landownership. 
The limitations of this scheme have 
been recognised for several decades but 
little change has been introduced either 
through case law or legislation. This is in 
part due to the fact that the rapidly 
increa sing reliance on groundwater in 
many parts of the country has led to a 
situation where state governments reali-
sed that they could avoid tackling an in-
creasingly bleak reality by fostering 
groundwater mining. Yet, this purpose-
ful policy inaction has now shown its 
 social, environmental and economic 
limits. The existing status quo is unten-
able in the long term because it leads to 
further deterioration of the resource on 
a yearly basis.
Groundwater regulation of the future 
needs to be based on the recognition 
that it must be available primarily for 
meeting needs related to the fundamen-
tal right to water, as well as ecosystem 
and livelihood needs. The existing legal 
framework that essentially hands con-
trol over groundwater to landowners is 
unacceptable because it does not recog-
nise the claims to groundwater of all 
other individuals in the country, and 
 because it precludes any aquifer-wide 
regulation of groundwater. 
This article starts by examining the 
 basic principles governing access to and 
use of groundwater inherited from the 
past and the partial reform framework 
proposed since 1970s. The second sec-
tion brings out some of the key short-
comings of the existing legal framework. 
Finally, the third section examines the 
latest model available for reforming 
groundwater regulation, the Planning 
Commission’s Model Bill for the Conser-
vation, Protection and Regulation of 
Groundwater, 2011.
1 Groundwater Regulation
The existing legal framework governing 
groundwater is based largely on princi-
ples developed during the second part of 
the 19th century and applied more or 
less consistently until today. Ground-
water regulation is characterised by the 
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Groundwater use in India has dra-matically increased over the last few decades. It is now the back-
bone of India’s food and drinking water 
security. Since 1970, an overwhelming 
majority (80%) of the total addition to 
the net irrigated area has come from 
groundwater ensuring that it accounts 
by now for around 60% of irrigation 
water use (Shankar et al 2011). Ground-
water is also the source of about 80% of 
drinking water needs.1 
The rapid increase in groundwater use 
has had negative impacts on aquifers in 
various parts of the country. Thus, by 
2004, 28% of the country’s blocks were 
showing alarmingly high levels of 
ground water use.2 In addition, many 
parts of India report severe water quality 
problems, causing drinking water vulner-
ability. Overall, nearly 60% of all districts 
in India have problems related  either 
to quantitative availability or to quality 
of groundwater or both (Planning Com-
mission 2011). 
The tremendous increase in ground-
water use has led to a situation where it 
is now the most crucial source of water 
for the realisation of the fundamental 
right to water. This simple fact implies 
that the use and protection of ground-
water needs to be given much more 
 attention in law and policy terms. This 
requires a major effort since until a few 
decades ago water laws were primarily 
conceived as surface water laws. 
For a variety of reasons, there has been 
relatively little attention to groundwater 
regulation until recently. This lack of 
focus on the basic framework governing 
groundwater use and protection is parti-
cularly problematic because the  existing 
groundwater legal framework is struc-
tured around an outdated, inequitable 
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fact that courts have played a leading role 
in shaping the rules that apply  today.
1.1 Rules Giving Landowners Full 
Control over Groundwater: Basic rules 
governing access to and use of ground-
water in India were laid down in English 
decisions in the second half of the 19th 
century. Since judges developed this 
area of the law, this should have given it 
ample scope for changing over time in 
line with changing circumstances and 
understanding of the science underlying 
the rules in place. Yet, with a few excep-
tions, the case law to date has not moved 
beyond the basic principles laid down in 
another country, for different climatic 
conditions, and at a point in time when 
the connections between surface and 
groundwater were not well-understood. 
The legislative framework, while under-
developed in this area, has further con-
tributed to stagnation. Indeed, the only 
direct reference to groundwater rights 
in the legislative framework is found in 
the Indian Easements Act, 1882 that sim-
ply confi rmed the principles developed 
in English case law.3
The fi rst basic principle applying to 
groundwater is that it should be treated 
differently from surface water. This was 
asserted in Chasemore vs Richards where 
the court determined that groundwater 
that percolates through underground 
strata, which has no certain course, no 
defi ned limits, but which oozes through 
the soil in every direction in which the 
rain penetrates is not subject to the 
same rules as fl owing water in streams 
or rivers.4
Once the distinction between the 
diffe rent bodies of water was made, it 
became possible for courts to defi ne a 
different set of rights applicable to 
groundwater. These were not derived 
from the existing rules for surface water 
that imposed signifi cant restrictions on 
the powers of landowners to appropriate 
water fl owing past their land. The case 
law subsequently gave landowners vir-
tually limitless control over groundwater. 
In Acton vs Blundell, the court found that 
the person who owns the surface may 
dig therein and apply all that is found 
there to his own purposes at his free will 
and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise 
of such right, he intercepts or drains off 
the water collected from under ground 
springs in his neighbour’s well, this 
inconvenience to his neighbour falls with-
in the description of damnum absque 
injuria (damage without injury), which 
cannot become the ground of  an action.5 
This was confi rmed in Chasemore vs 
Richards, which found that the right of 
the owner of a mill using spring water 
had no action against other landowners 
abstracting groundwater to the extent of 
affecting his own use of the water. This 
was because the judges determined that 
such a right would “interfere with, if not 
prevent, the draining of land by the 
owner”.6 One of the few limitations to 
have been placed on the rights of land-
owners concerns the case where ground-
water cannot be accessed without touch-
ing surface water in a defi ned surface 
channel. In this case, the landowner is 
then barred from accessing it.7
The general rules mentioned above 
did not apply in all situations. Indeed, 
the case law of the 19th century made a 
distinction between percolating ground-
water and groundwater fl owing in defi ned 
channels – where groundwater was 
found to fl ow in defi ned channels, the 
rules applicable to surface water would 
also apply. This meant that the right of 
the landowner was then limited to use 
and consumption for household and 
drinking purposes, for watering their 
cattle and for irrigating their land, or 
for purposes of manufacture, provided 
that the use was reasonable, that it was 
required for their purposes as owners of 
the land, and that it did not destroy or 
render useless or materially diminish or 
affect the application of the water by 
riparian owners below the stream in the 
exercise either of their natural right or 
right of easement, if any (Katiyar 2010). 
The application of the concept of 
defi ned channel to groundwater proved 
to be diffi cult because until the past 
few decades it was not easy to ascertain 
the existence of underground defi ned 
channels. In the early part of the 20th 
century, case law was no more specifi c 
than  requiring “a fairly defi ned course”, 
but this did not even need to be confi ned 
within banks or have a continuous fl ow,8 
thus making it diffi cult to apply to 
groundwater. Yet, in some cases, the 
concept of defi ned channel has been 
 applied to groundwater: First, in the 
context of a river running a few inches 
below its natural bed in the dry season, 
judges determined already in 1930 that 
“it was safe to say” that the water fl ow-
ing down the riverbed had a defi ned 
course.9 Second, in a case where a 
 landowner had built an underground 
trench taking off from a point 14 feet 
away from the outlet of a spring, it was 
held that while this was not the actual 
water of the spring, “there can be little 
doubt that there must be a direct chan-
nel between the top of the drain and the 
outlet” and there was thus no need for 
the channel to be “known” through ex-
cavation to  apply the rules concerning 
defi ned  channels.10 
The application of the concept of 
defi ned channel to groundwater leads to 
several conclusions: First, it confi rms that 
judges were from the start ambivalent 
about the legal status of ground water. 
Second, the cases applying the concept 
of defi ned channel can be seen as con-
fi rming that when a fl ow of groundwater 
could be identifi ed, judges were not 
averse to restricting the rights of land-
owners over groundwater. Third, the 
concept of defi ned channel has not 
proved to be an appropriate basis for trig-
gering a reform of groundwater rights.
On the whole, the rules highlighted 
here are at the very least outdated. Yet, 
the surprising element is the very limited 
evolution that has taken place over the 
past one and a half century. Indeed, 
while it was probably reasonable to 
expect that by the beginning of the 20th 
century a commentary on easements 
would be based on the cases cited here 
(Peacock 1904), it is much more surpris-
ing to fi nd that a leading commentary 
on easements published in 2010 still 
cites the same cases as being the most 
autho ritative statements of the law today 
(Katiyar 2010).
1.2 Limited Reforms since 1970: The 
need for reforms of groundwater law has 
been felt for decades and, at the very 
least, since the widespread introduction 
of mechanised pumping devices led to 
rapidly increasing groundwater use and 
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lowering water tables. This led the Gov-
ernment of India to acknowledge the 
need for a statutory framework govern-
ing groundwater. As a result, starting in 
1970, it put forward a Model Bill to Reg-
ulate and Control the Development and 
Management of Ground Water (Model 
Bill, 1970/2005) for adoption by the 
states. This model bill has been revised 
several times (1992, 1996 and 2005) but 
the basic scheme adopted in 1970 has 
been retained.
The basic scheme of the Model Bill, 
1970/2005 is to provide for the establish-
ment of a groundwater authority under 
the direct control of the government. 
The authority is given the right to notify 
areas where it is deemed necessary to 
regulate and control the development 
and management of groundwater. How-
ever, while the respective state govern-
ment takes the fi nal decision (Model Bill 
2005, s 5), there is no specifi c provision 
for public participation in this scheme. 
In any notifi ed area, every user of 
groundwater must apply for a permit 
from the authority unless the user only 
proposes to use a handpump or a well 
from which water is drawn manually 
(ibid: s 6). Wells need to be registered 
even in non-notifi ed areas (ibid: s 8). 
Decisions of the authority in granting or 
denying permits are based on a number 
of factors, which include technical fac-
tors such as the availability of ground-
water, the quantity and quality of water 
to be drawn, and the spacing between 
groundwater structures. The authority 
is also mandated to take into account 
the purpose for which groundwater is to 
be drawn, but the model bill does not 
prioritise domestic use of water over 
other uses.11 Basic drinking water needs 
are indirectly considered since, even in 
notifi ed areas, hand-operated devices do 
not require a permit (ibid: s 6(1)).
2 Need for a New Framework
A number of reasons call for the adop-
tion of new bases for groundwater regu-
lation. First, the existing set of rules was 
never appropriate for the country where 
they were introduced. Second, the un-
derlying legal framework has changed 
enormously since independence, as well 
as since 1970, requiring a rethink of 
groundwater regulation. Third, the im-
portance of groundwater has increased 
tremendously since the introduction of 
mechanised pumping to the extent that 
it is the primary source of water for all 
main water uses. 
The basic groundwater right frame-
work outlined above, as well as the Model 
Bill 1970/2005, is not an appropriate 
framework for the regulation of ground-
water in India in the 21st century. This is 
due to several reasons:
First, existing rules are based on a 
dated scientifi c understanding of ground-
water. This fails, for instance, to take 
into account patterns of aquifer recharge 
and the interconnectivity between surface 
and groundwater (Soman 2008). This 
translates into separate rules for surface 
water and groundwater.
Second, the existing legal framework 
is not adapted to conditions prevailing in 
large parts of India. This was already 
noted in 1930 in a groundwater case 
where justice Wallace determined that 
“my considered view is that conditions 
in England are so different to those in 
the district of Bellary that I deprecate 
calling in aid English law on this subject 
and confess that I do not myself fi nd it of 
any assistance here”.12 
Third, the present legal framework is 
socially inequitable. On the one hand, it 
gives landowners an overbearing power 
over groundwater; on the other, it 
excludes all landless groundwater users 
from the purview of the rules, even 
where groundwater is their main source 
of drinking and livelihood water.
Fourth, the existing legal regime limits 
itself at administering the respective 
claims of different landowners with no 
regard for the need to regulate ground-
water at an aquifer level. The limitations 
of existing rules have come up in more 
specifi c contexts, like the division of a 
single plot of land. In a case involving 
the division of a piece of land where a 
single well was found in the part remain-
ing with the original owner, the court 
found that in the absence of a clear 
 stipulation providing for access to the 
well, the new owners had not acquired 
such a right.13 The case focused entirely 
on the issue of the source of ground-
water and landowners’ claims to the 
same, rather than on the resource itself 
and the uses to which the groundwater 
might be put. 
The Model Bill 1970-2005 and the 
Acts derived from it warrant the same 
criticisms since they do not go beyond 
the existing basic legal framework. The 
Model Bill 1970-2005 does attempt to set 
out a framework for addressing ground-
water overuse. It does so by extending 
the state’s control over the use of ground-
water through the registration of sources 
of groundwater and the introduction of 
permits for groundwater extraction in 
regions where it is overexploited. Yet, 
this fails to effectively tackle existing 
overuse of groundwater since, in effect, 
it provides for the grandfathering of 
 existing uses by only requiring the regis-
tration of such uses (Model Bill 2005: 
s 7). This implies that in situations 
where there is already an overuse, it 
does not provide an effective basis for 
controlling it and will, at most, provide 
a basis for ensuring that future use is 
more sustainable.
With regard to the proposed institu-
tional framework, the Model Bill, 1970-
2005 also fails to provide a set-up that is 
capable of addressing the various aspects 
of groundwater regulation. It neither pro-
vides a single institution with a general 
mandate to look after groundwater in 
all its dimensions nor provides mecha-
nisms to ensure coordination  between 
the different institutions that have a 
mandate or the capacity to address 
groundwater use and conservation, such 
as pollution control boards and ground-
water authorities. Further, the framework 
Permission for Reproduction of 
Articles Published in EPW 
No article published in EPW or part thereof 
should be reproduced in any form without 
prior permission of the author(s). 
A soft/hard copy of the author(s)’s approval 
should be sent to EPW. 
In cases where the email address of the 
author has not been published along 
with the articles, EPW can be contacted 
for help.
PERSPECTIVES
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  NOVEMBER 10, 2012 vol xlvii no 45 43
is intrinsically top-down in its approach 
and focuses on the establishment of a 
state-level institution. 
3 The Groundwater Model 
Bill, 2011
The previous section has highlighted 
that the existing legal framework is 
incapable of addressing the challenges 
of groundwater use and conservation 
facing most states of the country (GoK 
2011: para 21.52). This makes an unas-
sailable case for reform in the context of 
the ever-increasing importance of 
ground water for all main water uses. 
This has been recognised by the Plan-
ning Commission’s approach paper for the 
12th Five-Year Plan stating that “[t]here 
is an urgent need to come out with a 
clear  legal framework governing the use 
of ground water”.14
While the theoretical case for re-
forms seems clear, the reality is that 
states have been slow to take up the 
challenge. This can be explained by the 
fact that groundwater has become so 
crucial that it is politically diffi cult to 
challenge the various vested interests 
that have been created around the exi-
sting pattern of water use. This trans-
lates in practice in states subsidising 
access to groundwater infrastructure 
or subsidising the energy necessary to 
pump it into a way to avoid having to 
regulate existing uses.15 
At the same time, in a number of 
states, the groundwater crisis is becom-
ing serious enough to force states to start 
taking some action. Three different types 
of responses can be identifi ed. First, in 
some cases the nexus between access to 
electricity and access to groundwater 
has been used to restrict groundwater 
use. This has, for instance, been done in 
Gujarat where electricity lines for irriga-
tion and domestic consumption have been 
separated (e g, Shah and Verma 2008). 
Second, some states that are oppo sed to 
adopting comprehensive groundwater 
legislation have nevertheless started us-
ing regulation as a tool for controlling 
groundwater use. This is the case of 
Punjab and Haryana that have taken a 
limited but a real step in this  direction 
with the adoption of a task-specifi c legis-
lation focusing on prohibiting sowing 
and transplanting of paddy before spe-
cifi c dates in order to reduce ground-
water use.16 Third, some states have 
adopted legislation based on the limited 
reform framework of the Model Bill, 
1970-2005.
The different answers given by states 
until now are noteworthy and impor-
tant. They confi rm that states are taking 
the groundwater challenge increasingly 
seriously. Yet, none of the three initia-
tives discussed in the previous paragraph 
provide a comprehensive solution that 
addresses groundwater use and prote-
ction in all its dimensions. The necessity 
for a broader approach stems from two 
issues: fi rst, in a context where ground-
water is the key source of water for reali-
sing the fundamental right to water of 
the overwhelming majority of the popu-
lation, regulation cannot be only con-
cerned with groundwater use for irriga-
tion despite the importance of the latter. 
Second, existing policy interventions are 
based on the need to address ground-
water scarcity but fail to provide bases 
for aquifer-based protection measures. 
There is thus a need for groundwater 
regulation that brings together the fun-
damental right to water dimension toge-
ther with livelihood uses and protection 
of groundwater. In addition, from a legal 
perspective, the present groundwater 
framework does not refl ect key judicial 
and constitutional developments of the 
past few decades.
In the context of an increasing recog-
nition of the need for a new framework 
regulating groundwater, the Planning 
Commission took up the challenge of 
preparing a new groundwater model 
bill in the context of the preparation of 
the 12th Five-Year Plan. The Model Bill 
for the Conservation, Protection and 
Regulation of Groundwater, 2011 (here 
onwards Groundwater Model Bill, 2011) 
provides a response to the shortcom-
ings of the existing legal framework in 
the context of the fast increasing reli-
ance on groundwater in most parts of 
the country.17 
The basic premise of the Groundwater 
Model Bill, 2011 is that it is small farmers 
and all persons living in rural areas 
that are most directly affected by the 
existing framework that gives exclusive 
control over groundwater to landowners 
and no effective control to other ground-
water users or democratically elected 
 local bodies of governance. The Ground-
water Model Bill, 2011 is thus based on 
the idea that while protection of ground-
water is a key to the long-term sustaina-
bility of the resource, this must be con-
sidered in a framework in which liveli-
hoods and basic drinking water needs 
are of central importance.
3.1 Basic Principles
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 fi nds 
its roots in existing constitutional and 
other legal principles, as well as existing 
laws in the water and related sectors. 
Thus, it is based on principles that have 
already been accepted in the legal fabric 
of the country. At the same time, it builds 
on developments that have taken place 
in the legal framework since the Govern-
ment of India proposed the fi rst Model 
Bill in 1970.
Public Trust and Subsidiarity: The 
Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 starts by 
recognising groundwater as a public trust 
(Groundwater Model Bill 2011: s 9). This 
brings the statutory regime in line with 
repeated Supreme Court  directives con-
cerning surface water,18 and the one 
case mentioning groundwater.19 This 
also ensures that groundwater and sur-
face water will be in the future treated 
under similar legal principles, providing 
the basis for much better coordination 
between the different sectoral water 
laws in force.
The recognition that groundwater is 
a public trust is a signifi cant change. 
 Indeed, it bears the potential to give 
communities the possibility to regulate 
groundwater use at the aquifer level. In 
other words, the recognition that ground-
water is a public trust does not diminish 
but rather enhances local control over 
the resource. 
Some safeguards are, however, neces-
sary to ensure that the change of legal 
status does not end up dispossessing  local 
communities further. This is why the 
Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 links the 
recognition of public trust with decentrali-
sation and the principle of subsidiarity.20 
It thus suggests that the trustee should 
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be the lowest possible democratically 
elected body that can regulate an entire 
aquifer. In other words, an  aquifer 
situated entirely within a panchayat is 
under the direct control of the Gram 
Panchayat Groundwater Committee. It is 
only in case the aquifer is shared with 
another panchayat that control is shared 
and the Block Panchayat Groundwater 
Committee faci litates the coordination 
of the planning process between the 
panchayats sharing the aquifer (ibid: 
Ss 18 and 20(1)b). 
The link between public trust and 
subsidiarity is absolutely crucial and 
severing the two would negate the re-
form  potential of the Groundwater Mod-
el Bill, 2011. Not linking the two would 
in effect hand over untrammelled power 
to the state government as the only trus-
tee. This would amount to doing little 
more than rebranding the state’s power 
of eminent domain as that of a trustee 
without creating effective new accounta-
bility mechanisms. Indeed, the only real 
check on the power of an all-powerful 
trustee would be the courts. This would 
not provide optimal results since court 
interventions do not provide quick results.
Fundamental Right to Water: The 
Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 starts by 
specifi cally integrating the fundamental 
right to water (ibid: S 8). This is a neces-
sity in legal terms given the repeated 
strictures of the higher judiciary for the 
past two decades.21 This is also neces-
sary in practical terms given the promi-
nence of groundwater as a source of 
drinking water. 
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 en-
sures that the right to water is specifi -
cally integrated within its operational 
provisions. It starts by giving drinking 
water the highest priority among ground-
water uses (ibid: S 10(2)). While this is 
uncontroversial, it is an important provi-
sion since there is no legislation that spe-
cifi cally confi rms this priority implied in 
the recognition of the right to water by 
the courts. 
The fundamental right to water frame-
work for the Groundwater Model Bill, 
2011 has broader consequences. Indeed, 
in a context where groundwater is the 
main source of water for 80% of indi-
viduals, control over the resource cannot 
be left entirely in private hands. This is 
again nothing new insofar as the very 
reason why actual ownership of surface 
water has been prohibited for centuries 
was the link between human survival 
and access to drinking water. Yet, in the 
context of groundwater, where the legal 
regime has condoned a form of an 
 appropriation linked to land rights, this 
necessitates a process of adaptation. 
At this juncture, the idea of delinking 
groundwater from land rights is gaining 
increasing support in policy circles. This 
is positive from the point of view of 
 ensuring that individual property rights 
over land do not come in the way of the 
realisation of the right to water for all. At 
the same time, this process of delinking 
land rights and groundwater should not 
be used to set up new tradable ground-
water entitlements. This is not a specu-
lative concern, since the introduction of 
tradable water entitlements has already 
been given a statutory recognition in 
Decentralisation and Local Governments
Edited by
T R RAGHUNANDAN
The idea of devolving power to local governments was part of the larger political debate during the Indian national 
movement. With strong advocates for it, like Gandhi, it resulted in constitutional changes and policy decisions in the 
decades following Independence, to make governance more accountable to and accessible for the common man.
The introduction discusses the milestones in the evolution of local governments post-Independence, while providing an 
overview of the panchayat system, its evolution and its powers under the British, and the stand of various leaders of the 
Indian national movement on decentralisation.
This volume discusses the constitutional amendments that gave autonomy to institutions of local governance, both rural 
and urban, along with the various facets of establishing and strengthening these local self-governments.
Authors: 
V M Sirsikar • Nirmal Mukarji • C H Hanumantha Rao • B K Chandrashekar • Norma Alvares • Poornima Vyasulu, Vinod Vyasulu • Niraja Gopal Jayal 
• Mani Shankar Aiyar • Benjamin Powis • Amitabh Behar, Yamini Aiyar • Pranab Bardhan, Dilip Mookherjee • Amitabh Behar • Ahalya S Bhat, Suman 
Kolhar, Aarathi Chellappa, H Anand • Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo • Nirmala Buch • Ramesh Ramanathan • M A Oommen • Indira 
Rajaraman, Darshy Sinha • Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal • M Govinda Rao, U A Vasanth Rao • Mary E John • Pratap Ranjan Jena, Manish Gupta • 
Pranab Bardhan, Sandip Mitra, Dilip Mookherjee, Abhirup Sarkar • M A Oommen • J Devika, Binitha V Thampi
Pp xii + 432        ISBN 978-81-250-4883-1        2012        Rs 695
Orient Blackswan Pvt Ltd
www.orientblackswan.com





Economic & Political Weekly EPW  NOVEMBER 10, 2012 vol xlvii no 45 45
some states.22 The implementation of the 
Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 will, thus, 
need to be carefully tailored so that the 
positive impacts for the realisation of the 
right to water of severing the link be-
tween land rights and groundwater are 
not negated by these new  private rights.
3.2 Institutional Framework 
The institutional framework of the 
Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 refl ects 
the decentralisation mandate of the 73rd 
and 74th amendments to the Constitution 
(Articles 243G and 243W). These amend-
ments have already been used in generic 
terms in various states, for instance, to give 
panchayats powers over water resources 
at the local level. The Groundwater Model 
Bill, 2011 goes further and applies the 
decentralisation principles to groundwater 
regulation. As mentioned above, this is 
further strengthened by a specifi c reli-
ance on the principle of subsidiarity. 
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 
 organises its institutional framework 
around existing units of territorial govern-
ance. At the same time, in recognition of 
the fact that aquifers do not necessarily 
follow administrative boundaries, it pro-
vides mechanisms to ensure that the lat-
ter do not come in the way of effective 
protection of groundwater  aquifers from 
the local to the state level.
The institutional framework is divided 
into rural and urban areas. In each case, 
the Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 pro-
vides for the setting up of groundwater 
committees starting at the lowest level of 
democratic governance. These are gram 
panchayat groundwater committees in 
rural areas and ward groundwater com-
mittees in urban areas (ibid: Ss 17 and 21). 
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 also 
provides for block and  municipal ground-
water committees to address issues that 
cannot be tackled at a lower level. In the 
case of rural areas, this includes “[c]oor-
dination of the planning process between 
panchayats sharing aquifers where the 
aquifer boundary does not correspond 
with boundaries of a single panchayat” 
(ibid: s 20(1)b). Further, it provides for 
the setting up of district groundwater 
councils tasked, for instance, with the 
coordination of measures taken at the 
block and municipal level and a state 
groundwater advisory council set up to 
provide advice and support to all 
groundwater bodies constituted under 
the legislation (ibid: sS 26(1)e and 28(1)).
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 also 
recognises that duplication of institu-
tions and mechanisms should be avoided 
to the greatest possible extent. Thus, it 
uses to the extent possible existing insti-
tutions. For instance, at the panchayat 
level, it provides for the setting up of a 
gram panchayat groundwater commit-
tee but specifi cally provides that where a 
village water and sanitation committee 
already exists, the latter will automati-
cally serve as groundwater committee 
(ibid: S 17(1)).
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 fur-
ther recognises that it is unrealistic to 
expect every local institution to have the 
scientifi c and technical expertise neces-
sary to perform all the given functions. 
As a result, a series of information and 
monitoring cells and supporting insti-
tutions are constituted to assist and 
help in the effective implementation of 
the Groundwater Model Bill, 2011. In an 
attempt to avoid the creation of addi-
tional capacity where it already exists, it 
is expected that these cells will draw on 
an existing institutional, scientifi c and 
technical capacity at all levels within the 
state, in particular the state ground-
water department and its district offi ces 
or the state pollution control board and 
its district offi ces (ibid: S 29(2)). In addi-
tion, the state government can notify 
agencies constituted under the law that 
can assist and help effective implemen-
tation, such as the state groundwater 
 department, the state pollution control 
board and the groundwater department 
(ibid S 30). All these supporting institu-
tions are duty-bound to assist and help 
authorities as per their demands from 
time to time (ibid: S 31(1)).
3.3 Groundwater Protection Zones
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 is 
built around the need to ensure that the 
resource itself is protected and can pro-
vide a sustainable basis for meeting the 
basic needs of every person for decades 
to come. It thus integrates protection 
principles, such as the prevention and 
precautionary principles (ibid: S 6(2)). 
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 intro-
duces two innovative instruments to foster 
groundwater protection, groundwater 
protection zones, and groundwater secu-
rity plans. These are conceived primarily 
for areas that suffer from groundwater 
depletion and are thus to be implemented 
according to the needs of specifi c areas.
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 fi rst 
provides for the possibility to demarcate 
Groundwater Protection Zones. The ob-
jectives for the demarcation of ground-
water protection zones link environmen-
tal and socio-economic aspects. Thus, 
groundwater protection zones are, for 
instance, demarcated to “[p]rotect the 
natural recharge and discharge areas of 
the aquifer from threats such as physical 
deterioration” and at the same time to 
“[p]rovide for suffi cient quantity and 
safe quality water required to meet the 
basic water supply for human and animal 
needs” (ibid: S 11(1)a and d).
Groundwater protection zones are to be 
demarcated by a process that is in part 
driven by the state groundwater board in 
consultation with other relevant bodies. It 
ends with a submission to the “appropriate 
authority”23 within which falls the geo-
graphical limit of each zone (ibid: S 12). 
There exist two types of groundwater 
protection zones. Groundwater Protec-
tion Zones 1 are areas where no extrac-
tion or use of groundwater is allowed, 
apart from its use as basic water, except 
under special sanction by the appro-
priate authority (ibid: S 13 (3)). In these 
zones, the appropriate authority is man-
dated to develop and apply rules regard-
ing, among others, forestation and defor-
estation, a prohibition of waste disposal of 
any kind and the banning of any mining 
lease. In Groundwater Protection Zones 2, 
a much less stringent set of rules is to be 
introduced, such as regarding distance 
to new wells and pumping regulation for 
existing wells (ibid: S 13(4)).
Groundwater protection zones are 
linked to another innovation – the intro-
duction of groundwater security plans. 
Section 14 provides that a groundwater 
security plan shall be prepared at the 
lowest possible administrative level that 
encompasses the whole aquifer. Ground-
water security plans are compulsory 
where a groundwater protection zone 
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has been defi ned and their preparation 
is left to the discretion of the appropriate 
authority in other cases (ibid: S 14 (3)). 
Groundwater security plans must “pro-
vide for groundwater conservation and 
augmentation measures, socially equita-
ble use and regulation of groundwater, 
and priorities for conjunctive use of sur-
face and groundwater” (ibid: S 15 (1)). 
Groundwater security plans are adopted 
by the appropriate authority and valid 
for fi ve years; they must then be revali-
dated or amended.
3.4 Regulation of Use
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 is based 
on an understanding that different ground-
water uses need to be regulated differ-
ently, something that was not done earlier. 
It starts by giving a general framework 
for the prioritisation of groundwater uses 
to guide authorities in the regulatory 
decisions they take (ibid: s 10). The fi rst 
priority is meeting the right to basic 
water for rural and urban residents. 
Beyond this, two categories of uses are 
defi ned: primary uses include direct use 
of groundwater for livelihoods, includ-
ing agriculture and non agriculture-based 
livelihoods and muni cipal use, including 
public facilities for recreation; second-
ary uses include  commercial activities, 
including power generation, industry 
and large-scale commercial farms and 
private facilities for recreation.
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 fi rst 
recognises that groundwater users also 
have a series of duties linked to their 
use. These include avoiding waste or 
contamination of groundwater, conser-
vation through appropriate agricultural 
and industrial practices and measures to 
replenish or recharge groundwater (ibid: 
S32). The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 
also calls for water harvesting and catch-
ment conservation, as well as recycling 
and reuse of groundwater (ibid: Ss 33 
and 34).
Beyond these general stipulations, the 
Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 regulates 
separately some of the main ground-
water uses. Concerning basic water, the 
Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 specifi es 
some of the elements of the right to  water 
(ibid: S 36). These include a reassertion 
of the universality of the entitlements 
contained in the right in a context of 
non-discrimination. It also includes a 
specifi c provision making drinking  water 
standards existing in different non-bind-
ing forms binding on drinking water 
supply agencies extracting groundwater.
With regard to the use of groundwater 
for livelihoods and irrigation, the start-
ing point is that every person is entitled 
to use groundwater for their livelihood 
needs (ibid: S 37(1)). The Groundwater 
Model Bill, 2011 further recognises that 
the “livelihood pattern and the resultant 
needs should be incorporated in ground-
water security plans” (ibid: S 37 (2)). At 
the same time, there is no absolute enti-
tlement and in case of severe drought or 
where the area has been declared a 
Groundwater Protection Zone 2, limits 
may be imposed for restricting water use 
(ibid: S 37 (3)). In the case of a Ground-
water Protection Zone 2, where water-
intensive cash crops are grown, an under-
taking shall be obtained for a change 
from water-intensive crops.
In the case of industrial, commercial 
and other bulk uses of groundwater, 
 including major or medium irrigation 
projects, the Groundwater Model Bill, 
2011 provides for a system of permits to 
abstract groundwater (ibid: SS38 and 
37(4)). These permits can be granted to 
applicants fulfi lling the conditions laid 
down with the exception of Groundwater 
Protection Zones 1 where permits cannot 
be granted. The Groundwater  Model 
Bill, 2011 also provides that  indu strial 
or bulk groundwater use shall be priced 
and a water rate shall be charged. Funds 
collected through  water rates are to be 
used for groundwater conser vation and 
augmentation activities (ibid: S 42).
3.5 Effective Implementation
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 includes 
a series of provisions that seek to ensure 
the smooth and effective implementa-
tion of its substantive stipulations. A 
separate chapter is devoted to social and 
environment impact assessment, trans-
parency and accountability. This builds 
largely on existing legal instruments, 
giving them a specifi c ground water focus. 
This is, for instance, the case with 
 regard to impact assessment. The Ground-
water Model Bill, 2011 builds on the 
 Environmental Impact Assessment Noti-
fi cation, 2006 and defi nes impact assess-
ment in a groundwater-specifi c context. 
It also adds a social impact  assessment 
with a view to consider both aspects 
 simultaneously. Environmental and so-
cial impact assessments are requi red at 
separate points in the Ground water 
Model Bill, 2011. Thus, Section 10 pro-
vides that the use or appropriation of 
water for secondary purposes (following 
discussion on secondary uses), which is 
likely to have signifi cant negative impacts 
on local sources of groundwater, shall be 
subject to an environmental and social 
impact assessment. Similarly, the permits 
to abstract groundwater for industrial 
use or infrastructure projects are granted 
on the basis of an impact assessment 
(ibid: S 39(4)).
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 
also includes a duty to establish trans-
parency systems. This builds on the Right 
to Information Act, 2005 and inclu des 
proactive mandatory disclosure, the 
right to inspect all documents and offi ces, 
and ensuring the transparency of the 
decision-making processes (ibid: Ss 45 
and 46). The Groundwater Model Bill, 
2011 also includes a provision for social 
audits to be conducted every 12 months. 
This is to be linked to other  social audits 
mandated under other laws or guide-
lines (ibid: S 47).
With regard to dispute resolution, the 
Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 starts by 
encouraging mediation and conciliation. 
Where disputes need to go through a 
formal process, the Groundwater Model 
Bill, 2011 sets up a framework that seeks 
to keep the process as close as possible to 
litigants while ensuring that the persons 
in charge are able to comprehend the 
technical issues that may arise. It does 
so through the provision of groundwater 
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level who must have experience and quali-
fi cation in the fi eld of law or hydrogeology 
or science and technology or social service 
or management or  water policy or human 
rights or public admini stration (ibid: S 53). 
In addition, the Groundwater Model Bill, 
2011 also provides for a Nyaya Mitra 
holding a bachelor’s degree in law at 
the district level to assist groundwater 
grievance redressal offi cers in discharg-
ing their duties (ibid: S 55). 
Groundwater grievance redressal 
offi cers are given jurisdiction over all 
complaints arising within the area for 
which they have been appointed. They 
are  given the same powers and obliga-
tions as vested in a civil court. Appeals 
from the groundwater grievance redres-
sal  offi cers can be preferred to the Gram 
Nyayalya set up under the Gram Nyaya-
layas Act, 2008 in rural areas and before 
the sub-court in urban areas.
4 Conclusions
The Groundwater Model Bill, 2011 pro-
vides a basis for rethinking groundwater 
regulation. It is appropriately framed as 
a model bill that needs to be tailored to 
the needs and circumstances of indivi-
dual states. This also fi ts with the fact 
that it is states that have legislative com-
petence for regulating water.
The existence of a new model that can 
be used by states for drafting legislation 
is a welcome step forward. It provides a 
template that incorporates various things 
that states must do because they are 
part of the legal framework applicable 
throughout the country and provides 
the fl exibility to adopt substantive, pro-
cedural and institutional provisions to 
the specifi c legal framework in place at 
the state level. 
The theoretical and constitutional 
fl exibility that exists is a positive element 
of a federal democracy. At the same time, 
the history of the Model Bill, 1970/2005 
does not indicate that the possibility to 
adapt a model bill to regional needs is 
necessarily taken up in every case. It is 
thus essential to ensure that the Ground-
water Model Bill, 2011 does not follow 
the same path. This will require doing 
several key things in each state. First, 
very little work has been done to analyse 
the way in which traditional rules have 
been applied in practice either at the 
local or state level. The main source of 
information is court judgments, which 
only provide a snapshot of the reality on 
the ground. Second, there has been little 
interest in the ground water laws based 
on the Model Bill, 1970-2005. A much 
more in-depth understanding of the rea-
sons underlying the lack of implementa-
tion, the successes and the failures are 
necessary to ensure that the next model 
builds on existing experience. Third, 
this analytical process must be followed 
by the involvement of all groundwater 
users in turning the model bill into 
legislation at the state level. This in-
cludes an effective participation from 
the panchayat/ward to the state level. 
This is not specifi c to groundwater but 
requires strong reaffi rmation following 
the adoption of some water laws without 
suffi cient participation in general, and 
even without suffi cient  debate in the 
legislative assembly. 
Groundwater is now the main source 
of water for all main water uses and 
needs to be given the policy attention it 
deserves. The fact that it is a politically 
sensitive topic because any reform will 
affect some powerful constituencies 
cannot be an excuse anymore for lack of 
action. Inaction only increases existing 
inequalities in access to groundwater by 
progressively reinforcing the power of 
bigger landowners at the expense of 
 other water users. Further inaction has a 
price that will be borne by future gener-
ations since use beyond yearly replenish-
ment is by defi nition an “unsustainable” 
use of groundwater in the longer term. 
The fact that this may be beyond the 
time horizon of the average offi ce holder 
cannot be an excuse for delaying action 
until it is too late.
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